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ABSTRACT 
After some introductory remarks on constitutive rules I proceed to one problem still insuffi-
ciently handled in the constitutive rules research: that of how coordinate the definitional 
exigence that constitutive rules should define new (types of ) activities and, on the other 
hand, the claim that constitutive rules should be a disjoint class with that of regulative or 
prescriptive rules. I analyse briefly several examples, such as promises or interest-charging, 
or ‘sprezzatura’, and set out a number of problems and complexities inherent in these ex-
amples. Yet I also indicate commonalities shared by all of them.Short of offering a solution, 
I put forward the hypothesis that constitutive rules may in some cases be in rerum natura 
bound up with prescriptive norms and can be divided from them only in virtue of a theo-
retical analysis. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There are things known for the most part as ‘constitutive rules’2. In the words 
of Amedeo G. Conte, “A rule is constitutive if it is a prius of that around which 
it revolves. A classical case: the rules of chess. [...] The rules of chess do not 
revolve around an activity that preexists them and which exists independently 
of them. On the contrary, it is these rule themselves that render the game 
thinkable and possible. [...] In constitutive rules there is a paradoxical 
inversion of the relation between the rule and the entity governed by it: It is 
paradoxical that rules govern that which is their posterius; it is paradoxical 
that such rules should be both an (eidetic) condition of conceivability and an 
(alethic) condition of possibility of an activity.”3 
                                                     
1 Based on the text of the lecture delivered on the 12. of January 2010 at Facoltà di 
Filosofia, Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy. 
2 Some very general information on constitutive rules was disseminated by the present 
author during the XXI World Congress of Philosophy in Istanbul, Turkey, in 2003, see 
www.wcp2003.org/humanrights/wojciech_Zelaniec.rtf. 
3 ‘Costitutiva è una regola la quale sia il prius di ciò su cui essa verte. Caso classico: le rego-
le del gioco degli scacchi [...]. Le regole degli scacchi non vertono su un’attività che ad esse 
preesista e che sussista indipendentemente da esse. Al contrario, sono le regole stesse a 
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The concept of a constitutive rule is associated in many minds with the 
name of John R. Searle, but the phenomenon itself was first discovered in the 
‘twenties of the twentieth century, by Czesław Znamierowski, a Polish phi-
losopher of law and social ontologist.4 Searle did not either invent or pretend 
to invent it; yet he made it (relatively) well-known. But while constitutive 
rules are relatively well-known as a class of phenomena, they are still not so 
well understood; not even the exact delimitation of this class is uncontrover-
sial, still less the internal articulation of all the various things falling within 
that class. It is a purpose of this essay to explain some problems with what 
might be called the ontological aspect of the constitutivity of constitutive 
rules. A comprehensive setting out of the problems will be, as is to be hoped, a 
first step to solving at least some of them.5 
Searle, while making the now classic distinction between constitutive and 
regulative rules disclaimed originality and in the spirit of what may seem 
somewhat excessive modesty, claimed to be reintroducing a distinction made 
by Kant,6 who, however, did not make it. Kant’s was only the distinction of 
constitutive and regulative principles and the use thereof; ‘constitutive’ and 
‘regulative’ being understood in sense quite distinct from Searle’s.7 However, 
due to Searle’s influence, it has become part of the common notion of a consti-
tutive rule that it, whatever else it is, is not a regulative rule. A regulative rule, 
in Searle’s sense, is roughly one that prescribes, ‘regulates’, tells what someone 
may, ought to, or must not do.8 In his essay ‘How to Derive `Ought’ from `Is’’ 
Searle says: “The distinction I am trying to make was foreshadowed by Kant’s 
distinction between regulative and constitutive principles, so let us adopt his 
terminology and describe our distinction as a distinction between regulative 
and constitutive rules. Regulative rules regulate activities whose existence is 
___________________________________________ 
rendere e pensabile, e possibile il gioco. [...] Nelle regole costitutive v’è una paradossale 
inversione del rapporto tra regola e regolato: è paradossale che delle regole ordinino qual-
cosa che, logicamente ed ontologicamente, è un posterius di esse; è paradossale che, di 
un’attività, le regole stesse siano e condizione (eidetica) di pensabilità, e condizione (aleti-
ca) di possibilità.’ [1], p. 239. 
4 Znamierowski used the Polish expression ‘norma konstrukcyjna’ or ‘construction norm’. 
Not too much attention should be, in this field, attached to terminological variation; ‘con-
stitutive rule’ seems, in any case, the most common term of art. On Znamierowski see e. g. 
[2]. In Italian, there are two texts by him: [3] and [4]; a valuable source of information on 
Znamierowski (in Italian) is: [5]. 
5 [6], p.33. 
6 [7], p. 55. More to the point, Searle refers back to the distinction between ‘summary 
view’ and ‘practice conception’ made by Rawls in [8]: [7], p. 55. 
7 For a nearly exhaustive discussion of the problem of constitutive rules in Kant see [9]. 
8 All of which belongs to the province of ‘deontic logic’, see [10]. The discipline was ‘in-
vented’ by G. H. v. Wright, see [11]. For a historical sketch see also [12], [13] and [14]. 
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independent of the rules; constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate) forms 
of activity whose existence is logically dependent on the rules.”9 
At another locus classicus in his Speech Acts, Searle explains: “I want to clar-
ify a distinction between two different sorts of rules, which I shall call regula-
tive and constitutive rules. I am fairly condent about the distinction, but do 
not nd it easy to clarify. As a start, we might say that regulative rules regu-
late antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior; for example, 
many rules of etiquette regulate interpersonal relationships which exist inde-
pendently of the rules. But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they cre-
ate or dene new forms of behavior. The rules of football or chess, for example, 
do not merely regulate playing football or chess, but as it were they create the 
very possibility of playing such games. The activities of playing football or 
chess are constituted by acting in accordance with (at least a large subset of) 
the appropriate rules. Regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an ac-
tivity whose existence is logically independent of the rules. Constitutive rules 
constitute (and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is logically de-
pendent on the rules.”10 
Much has been said on these lines;11 I shall add nothing by way of comment 
or elaboration upon these loci classici; neither shall I dwell on the historical 
aspect of things; it has been treated separately elsewhere, even though a com-
prehensive history of the research on the problem is still lacking.12 Instead, I 
shall proceed to the core of the matter. 
A constitutive rule is a rule that is constitutive in the sense of ‘giving rise 
to’, or ‘creating’ that of which it is a rule. So what is a ‘rule’, to begin with? 
The famous Aristotelian adage ‘being is said in many ways’13 seems to be true 
of rules, too. There is no ‘canonical’ definition of a rule. There is, to be sure, an 
entry in Isidor’s Etymologies, XIX, 18, 2, viz. Regula dicta quod sit recta, quasi 
rectula, et inpedimentum non habeat, a ‘rule is called so because it is straight and 
has no impediment’ but it pertains to building tools and defines, if anything, 
rather ‘ruler’ (measuring stick) than ‘rule’. In later dictionaries, the corre-
sponding entries (if any) are more often than not short and concise, as if in 
keeping with the sense of ‘regula’ in Roman Law: ‘regula est, quae rem quae est 
breviter enarrat’, or with the explanation for ‘regula’ in Goclenius’ Lexicon Phi-
losophicum of 1613: ‘brevis rerum praeceptio’, for brief they are, indeed. Abbag-
nano, in his Dizionario di filosofia, says that a rule is a name for any and every 
prescriptive proposition, ‘Si chiama regola qualsiasi proposizione prescrittiva’, 
                                                     
9 [7], p. 55. 
10 [15], pp. 33f. 
11 For instance, in [16]. 
12 But see for instance [17], [18] or [19]. A very valuable source on the history is, too, [20]. 
13 Metaphysics VII, 1003a, 33. 
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under the name of ‘rule’ goes any prescriptive proposition.14 Then he adds: ‘Il 
termine è generalissimo e comprende le nozioni più ristrette di norma, massima e 
legge’, the term ‘rule’ is most general and includes those more restricted ones 
like ‘norm’, ‘maxim’ or ‘law’. Probably with this excuse in mind the Enciclo-
pedia filosofica refuses to place an entry on ‘rule’, referring the reader to such 
entries as ‘law’, ‘maxim’ or ‘principle’.15 At least the Enciclopedia Einaudi fea-
tures an extensive entry on norma by Norberto Bobbio. In a recent English-
language lexicographic publication, the highly authoritative-looking Encyclo-
paedia of Philosophy published by Routledge and edited by Edward Craig, 
there is no entry for ‘rules’ at all. Its predecessor in the Anglo-Saxon world, 
the Encyclopedia of Philosophy edited by Paul Edwards, sported at least a not-
so-brief article on ‘rule’ by the American Wittgenstein-scholar Newton Garver. 
A laudable exception to this – should we say – near-rule is the Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie, edited by Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer 
with Amedeo G. Conte’s sub-entry on ‘rule’.16 But that sub-entry pertains to 
constitutive rules only. There is also a remarkable study by Gregorio Robles, 
[24]. 
In the context of constitutive rules, one point concerning the general notion 
of a rule deserves, perhaps, particular attention. It is that of the linguistic 
formulation of a rule. Is it necessary for every rule to have a linguistic formu-
lation and articulation? There are ‘silent’ or ‘tacit’ laws, for instance those 
studied by Roberto Sacco (his atti muti17), so why should there be not silent 
rules, including constitutive rules? This is a real problem, because, if a consti-
tutive rule should ‘create’ something (i. e., bring into being something not pre-
viously existing) then it must itself come into existence and/or become accessi-
ble at a certain point of time, in a way in which, for instance, natural law (as 
traditionally conceived) has not, being coeval with human race and having 
always been known (however vaguely) to human beings.18 And being accessi-
ble in a linguistic form is a preferred form of being accessible for such entities 
as rules. However, for the moment, let us assume that rules are, if not always 
actually formulated in a language, then at least susceptible of a formulation in 
a language. The truly philosophical quest for that which a thing really is, the 
                                                     
14 [21], p. 718. 
15 [22], p. 1922. 
16 [23]. 
17 See [25]. See [26], pp. 26f. 
18 But similarly, it was St. Augustin’s view that the Commandments have been ‘engraved 
on people’s hearts’ (De spiritu et littera, c. XIVf., Patrologia Latina, vol. XLIV, col. 215f., 
Enarratio in Bibliam, c. LVII, n 1.; Patrologia Latina, vol. XXXVI, col. 673ff.), cf. also 
Irenaeus, Contra. Haereses., 1, IV, c. XIII; Patrologia Graeca, vol. VII, col. 1006ff., Tertul-
lian, Adversos Judaeos, c. II; Patrologia Latina, vol. II, col. 600; a similar strand of 
thought is to be found in the Jewish tradition, as well. 
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Aristotelian ‘τί ἐστι´, is here best suspended in favour of a tentative and hypo-
thetical identification of a rule with its linguistic formulation; no claim is made 
to the effect that rules simply ‘are’ their linguistic formulation, but only, that 
they are conveniently managed under the guise of such formulations, if and 
whenever such are available. 
Students of constitutive rules have often insisted on a double distinction de-
limiting their object from other rules. One part of the distinction is that al-
ready mentioned one between constitutive and ‘regulative’ or prescriptive 
rules.19 The other part is the distinction between constitutive and descriptive 
rules. Descriptive rules state what happens or is the case ‘as a rule’, ‘on a regu-
lar basis’, ‘most often’ or ‘always’. ‘As a rule, nights in the desert are chilly’. 
They range from naive empirical generalisations to scientific laws, such as 
‘Platinum boils at 4100 grades Kelvin’.20 That which a descriptive rule de-
scribes exists already, in one form or another; and that which a prescriptive or 
regulative rule regulates exists already, otherwise the prescribing would be 
pointless. 
Now the claim – seldom explicit in the corresponding studies – that consti-
tutive rules, i. e. those that by definition ‘constitute’, ‘create’ or ‘give rise to’ 
that which they are rules of, are neither descriptive nor prescriptive is, on 
closer reflection, not so obvious as it might first seem. It does not easily, or at 
all, follow from the very concept of a constitutive rule as that of a rule which 
‘creates’ its own object. It would be all good if we had a clear dividing line be-
tween, on one hand, all descriptive and all prescriptive rules and, on the other 
hand, a third domain of rules of which all constitutive rules would be a proper 
                                                     
19 In his [27] ([28], p. 157), one of the very first of his texts in which he (without reference 
to predecessors) speaks of ‘constitutive rules’, Amedeo G. Conte says that the ‘validity 
criterium of regulative rules is not itself a regulative rule (a rule in terms of Sollen 
[ought]), it is a constitutive rule (a rule in terms of Sein)’ (italics in the original). I take this 
to mean that a rule, if it is constitutive, by the very same token cannot be regulative. 
Also, on a different plane, there are what Amedeo G. Conte calls ‘deontic constitutive 
rules’, i. e. those which have the form of a prescriptive proposition, for instance, ‘the 
bishop (in chess) ought to move diagonally’. See for instance [1], p. 243, or [29], p. 55. 
Conte mentions this concept in virtually all of his numerous publications on constitutive 
rules. As Conte notes with Aristoteles, however, ‘that which ought to be done’ (τὸ δέον) is 
said in numerous senses no less than ‘being’ (τὸ ὄν): [30], p. 104. For Searle’s project of 
deriving Ought from Is it is crucial that at least certain constitutive rules (such as those 
constituting the institution of promise, for instance, should not be also regulative; [20] for 
that (in [31], which is an earlier version of [20], pp. 88f.). Searle’s formulation such as 
‘constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate)’ ([7], p. 55) are careless, at best. 
20 Abstraction is made here from all contrary-to-fact undertones and explanatory func-
tions of scientific laws, see for instance [32] for that. 
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or improper subset.21 But such a dividing line – this is the ‘demarcation prob-
lem’ for constitutive rules – is not so easily found.22 
Starting off with a rather easy example: The Decalogue rules are not consti-
tutive,23 because those aspects of human conduct which they (more or less suc-
cessfully, as we know from universal history) attempt to regulate could have 
arisen and did arise independently of the Decalogue. People had gone on (not) 
honouring their parents for millennia, for instance, before they learned that it 
was mandatory for them to honour, rather than not to honour, their parents. 
But street traffic rules are a somewhat subtler or ‘trickier’ example, perhaps, 
because it is not clear that there once was a time when there was street traffic 
but no street traffic rules (both might have arisen at the same time; this is an 
empirical, not a philosophical question). Yet, it seems to be plausibly accept-
able that there at least could have been street traffic without any rules thereof, 
and those who have visited certain countries (for understandable reasons to 
remain nameless in this essay) claim that there in fact is such rule-free traffic, 
in these countries. But on the other hand, those very same persons testify, 
sometimes with an air of terror in their voice, that such rule-free traffic is a 
quite different kind of traffic from that regulated by the familiar traffic code 
of home. Thus, regulative rules can, too, in a sense be constitutive. Part of the 
problem is that we are dealing with ‘forms of behaviour’ which, whatever else 
they are, do not belong in the category of substance in the Aristotelian onto-
logical framework and therefore do not have a proper essence and definition in 
either the Aristotelian or any other rigorous sense;24 so we are not, and cannot 
be, certain when a given ‘form of behaviour’ is, or is not, sufficiently ‘new’. 
How unlike all ‘forms of behaviour’ hitherto existing must a form of behaviour 
be to count as ‘substantially’ or ‘really’ new? This is not an easy question if we 
are dealing with non-substantial entities. 
                                                     
21 Well, rather proper, given that there are, too, technical rules which do not seem to be 
prescriptive, descriptive or constitutive (e. g. [33], pp. 292f.). See [34]. 
22 See also [35]. 
23 Pace Searle, who ([7], p. 57, [15], pp. 186f) mentions the rules ‘You ought not to steal’, 
‘You ought not to tell lies’ and ‘You ought to pay debts’ as examples of constitutive rules. 
Conte justly remarks that these rules are not constitutive even by Searle’s lights, [36], pp. 
538f. In fairness to Searle, however, it must be noted that Searle only says that such rules 
‘can be taken’ (to mean, i. e. understood, interpreted) as constitutive rules of the institu-
tion of private property, assertion and debt, respectively. That is, they could be rewritten, 
in Searle’s language, as something like ‘Private property of someone else counts as some-
thing which one must not dispose of without that person’s consent’ and so on. This brings 
back the problems of the relation between a rule and its linguistic expression, the onto-
logical status of a rule and similar, mentioned above. 
24 For this see Metaphysics VII, esp. ch. 4. 
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2. Some examples 
 
In order for philosophical reflection not to work in the void or be all-too-
abstract, let us consider a few examples of situations in which constitutive 
rules might be surmised to be involved. The very issue of ‘constitutivity’, ‘cre-
ating’ (that which a given rule is a rule of) or ‘giving rise to’ being a difficult 
problem in itself, I shall make clear that in what follows I am focussing on the 
‘ontological’ aspect the constitutive power of constitutive rules, that is, their 
faculty of bringing things into existence. There are other aspects, no less im-
portant, such as the epistemological and the semantical one: constitutive rules 
make certain kinds of knowledge (the knowledge of that which they are rules 
of) possible; they assign, too, meanings to words and expressions (viz. those 
designating the things which they constitute and their components).25 I shall 
prescind from these other aspects of constitutivity for merely tactical reasons 
(one cannot speak of all things at once), not because I consider them less im-
portant or interesting.26 
Searle and those influenced by him speak of ‘activities’ or ‘forms of behav-
iour’. So what is a ‘form of behaviour’, to begin with?27 If this question sounds 
a little too abstract, let us consider another one: in what kind of cases should 
we say that a form of behaviour is ‘new’ and could have been given rise to in 
virtue of rules of some sort, be they written or tacit? I think every person with 
a certain experience in travelling and living in foreign countries for more than 
just a few days or holidays (and most persons in the Academe have this kind of 
                                                     
25 See for instance [1] , p. 239, where the ontological and logical aspect of the constitutiv-
ity of rules are being treated on a par. See, too, [17], p. 354 for the semantical sense of con-
stitutivity, explicitly mentioned. For all three aspects (ontological, epistemological, se-
mantical) see [37] and [38]. Cf. also [39], pp. 72–4, where, too, the epistemological and 
semantical aspects seem to be placed much emphasis on. 
26 Contrary to what one may suspect, the preoccupation with epistemological and seman-
tic aspects of what might first and foremost be an ontological issue is not restricted to con-
temporary or modern philosophers, those after the Cartesian or the linguistic turn. For 
instance, in ch. 19 of Book XIX of his City of God St. Augustine argues that a bishop in-
terested in eminence rather than in service is simply not a bishop, this sounds very much 
like a classic quotation from a contemporary student of constitutive rules (cf. [33], p. 293: 
‘whoever not follows deontic eidetic-constitutive rules while playing chess is not playing 
chess poorly; he is simply not playing chess’). But for his claim, St. Augustin invokes a 
semantic argument: ‘episkopos’ or ‘bishop’, is derived from a Greek work for ‘superintend’; 
he, too, imputes to St. Paul (1 Tim., 3, 1) the desire to explain what ‘episcopate’ meant, 
and sees therein a further argument for his claim. 
27 Amedeo G. Conte gives serious thought to this issue and brings a form of behaviour in 
relation with the Wittgensteinian concept of ‘form of life’ (Lebensform), so important for 
Wittgeinstein’s theory of a language-game: [40], p. 317. 
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experience) knows the problem of inviting or getting invited to one’s home. In 
different cultures and countries this is handled in a different way, and subtle 
nuances distinguish the way in which a ‘form of behaviour’ like that is culti-
vated even in cultures that seem quite alike. In certain situations the foreign 
scholar abroad awaits in vain an invitation to a colleague’s home which he 
thinks is due or overdue and he takes its non-coming to be a sign of insensitiv-
ity, distrust or non-appreciation; in other cases, on the contrary, he is sur-
prised by an invitation he28 thinks quite unexpected, uncalled-for, inoppor-
tune... . What is at issue is not spending some time together, discussing some 
topics, drinking tea or taking a meal in each other’s company (all of these 
things can be done at other places), but precisely this: inviting or getting in-
vited to somebody’s or one’s own home. Precisely this is the subject of concern 
or astonishment. The foreign scholar is likely to think of it as a ‘form of behav-
iour’ and think it new, certainly not absolutely, but as it is defined and culti-
vated in the country of his stay and as compared to his own country. Charac-
teristically, this form of behaviour is embedded in a larger context: that of 
things done when invited or otherwise to somebody’s home: drinking tea, dis-
cussing things work-related or otherwise, showing each other family photo-
graphs, and so on. 
It is perhaps not very frequent but it can well happen that a scholar abroad 
should start thinking that certain forms of behaviour are ‘new’ in his host-
culture to the extent that they are not at all known in this culture. And in 
some cases they really are unknown, for various reasons. For example, one 
very important social ‘rite’ in Poland, called ‘bruderszaft’29 is the stepping-
down from the formality of addressing one another as ‘pan(i)’ (sir, madam) to 
the informal ‘ty’ form of address, which does not and simply cannot exist in an 
English-speaking country, there being no analogous distinction in the form 
address in English. In these countries, there is just one neutral form of address, 
‘you’, and being on first-name terms as distinct from using a formal way of 
address (Mr. Smith, Dr. Pearce, Rev. Hobotham) is regulated in a way not re-
quiring any ‘rite of passage’ (saying ‘Call me Judy’ by a Dr. Pearce is not a 
‘rite’ in the way in which Polish bruderszaft is). In this case we should say an 
objective constraint (a peculiarity of the language) makes a form of behaviour 
impossible. 
But it would be ludicrous to claim that an ‘objective constraint’ like that 
prevents one from showing or not showing how much effort one usually in-
                                                     
28 Throughout this essay, the pronouns ‘he’, ‘his’ and ‘him’ are meant to refer to no less 
female than male persons. 
29 An obvious adaptation from German ‘Bruderschaft’ or ‘brotherhood’, the adequate Eng-
lish word might well be ‘fraternisation’. In German-speaking countries there used to be a 
rite of ‘Bru-’ or ‘Brüderschafttrinken’, yet it does not seem to be cultivated any more. 
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vests in an activity which by its very nature does require at least some effort. 
Yet, as observation teaches, in different cultures effort is spent with different 
degrees of ostentation, the degrees considered ‘correct’ being a matter of cul-
tural code. At Italian Renaissance courts prevailed a rule, called ‘sprezzatura’ 
or ‘negligence’, which in a sense (which is an important qualification here, as 
we shall presently see) prescribed that things should be done as if without any 
effort at all. As Castiglione says: “But, having often thought with my self 
whence this Gracefulness could proceed, I find one general Rule, which I think 
holds good in all Cases, and that is, that a Man should as much as possible 
avoid, as a dangerous Rock, too much Exactness, but make use of a certain 
kind of Negligence, and do every thing easy, and, as it were without minding 
it. And this I really believe is the Cause of it”;30 viz., of the Gracefulness, 
which Castiglione observed in his courtiers. 
There is a difference, though, between the two examples. The rite of bruder-
szaft, even though simple (or simplified recently) is so complex that it is not 
likely that it could be carried out without any knowledge of its rules; and even 
if it had once been so carried out, the persons involved could not be truly said 
to have carried it out; just as little as a Polish person saying ‘tak, tak’ (‘yes 
yes’, ‘yes of course’) can be truly considered to be expressing gratitude in Dan-
ish (‘tak’ meaning ‘thank you’ in Danish).31 In the case of sprezzatura, however, 
it is quite thinkable that someone should behave in the way defined by the 
rule, without knowing the rule and without knowing that the way he is behav-
ing is called ‘sprezzatura’. 
Another instructive example is that of interest (in the sense of fee paid on 
borrowed assets). 
If we are to believe Tacitus, the ancient Teutons did not know it, still less 
did they know the concomitant institution of usury. For this reason, he thinks, 
no prescriptive rules (edicts etc.) against either would have been necessary. 
Tacitus says in ch. 26 of his Germania: ‘Faenus agitare et in usuras extendere 
ignotum; ideoque magis servatur, quam si vetitum esset’, or ‘To loan out capital 
                                                     
30 [41], p. 43 (Robert Samber’s translation). In Italian: ‘Ma avendo io già più volte pensa-
to meco onde nasca questa grazia, lasciando quelli che dalle stelle l’hanno, trovo una regu-
la universalissima, la qual mi par valer circa questo in tutte le cose umane che si facciano o 
dicano più che alcuna altra, e ciò è fuggire quanto più si po, e come un asperissimo e peri-
coloso scoglio, la affettazione; e, per dir forse una nova parola, usar in ogni cosa una certa 
sprezzatura, che nasconda l’arte e dimostri ciò che si fa e dice venir fatto senza fatica e 
quasi senza pensarvi. Da questo credo io che derivi assai la grazia […]’ Baldassare Casti-
glione, Il cortegiano, libro I, xxvi. 
31 The difficulty is that both Poles and Danes say their respective ‘tak, tak’, very often and 
at a great variety of occasions – this being clearly a matter of the respective national cul-
ture codes – in their different meanings; a Danish person in Poland or a Polish person in 
Denmark is quite often confused, as a result. 
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at interest and extend it into interest payments is unknown, and for that rea-
son more effectively guarded against than if it had been banned.’32 Tacitus 
does not stop to speculate, to be sure, if taking interest had, indeed, been 
banned, Teutons would still not have known what, actually, was banned; in-
stead, he clearly asserts, in the indicative, that since Teutons do not know the 
institution in question, they do not put it into practice. 
Since interest and usury are institutions far more important than degrees of 
formality of address or an Italian courtier’s ‘sprezzatura’ (with all due respect 
for the Italian Renaissance), their history has amply been investigated (by 
von Mises, Keynes and many others) and so it is a matter of scholarly debate 
just to which peoples and at which epochs they were known. From the phi-
losophical point of view it appears plausible to say that a culture cannot prac-
tice charging interest and usury without knowing of these institutions, al-
though their names will be different in different languages. The situation is 
very unlike that of ‘sprezzatura’; the latter you can all-but-practice, virtually 
practice, with the sole difference to the Italian courtier that you are not aware 
of it and its rules (nor of the name ‘sprezzatura’), while no human practice can 
‘come close’ to interest-charging if the agents are not at least vaguely aware of 
its rules, just as no practice can ‘come close to’ playing chess if rules are chess 
are not at least vaguely known and borne in mind by the agents involved.33 
‘Sprezzatura’ is similar to Molière’s ‘speaking prose’, though it is not quite like 
it: M. Jourdain had been speaking prose unbeknownst to him, he had not 
‘come close’ speaking prose. But interest-charging is not at all similar to 
‘speaking prose’, and neither is chess: you cannot practice either if you are not 
aware of a set of rules. 
Yet another example is the institution of promising; in fact one ‘primordial’ 
for the whole constitutive rules research, as it was in its context that Searle 
started talking about constitutive rules. Strange though this may seem, the 
institution is not universally known, it is not a cultural universal. Some ‘sav-
age’ cultures do not know it,34 and in diverse ‘civilised’ ones it is put into prac-
                                                     
32 [42], p. 87. 
33 ‘Vaguely borne in mind’ might seem too little in the case of chess. Yet, the author recol-
lects having participated, as a young boy, in games of chess or even chess tournaments – it 
was in a boys’ summer camp – where at least some players had a very incomplete knowl-
edge of the rules. 
34 See e. g. [6], pp. 3ff. See also [43]. DuBois does not say explicitly that the Alorese did 
not know the institution of promise, but describes a society in which such ‘promises’ (as 
may be known) are as a rule not kept and in which no-one expects them to be kept. See for 
instance p. 236. On pp. 121f. we read: ‘I have seen youths in their late teens and early 
twenties send boys on fool’s errands and deceive them with false promises of rewards for 
services, and then guffaw with laughter when the crestfallen child returned.’ If we are to 
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tice in different modes, especially with respect to the degree to which promises 
are (believed to be) generally kept.35 Now this example is different from all the 
above, because in the institution of promise the very word ‘promise’ (or its 
equivalent in a given local language) is an essential constitutive component. 
There is no question of acts of promising without the awareness (however inar-
ticulate) of the rules of promise, one of which is that one ought to, while prom-
ising, say ‘I promise’, ‘obiecuję’, ‘prometto’, or something like that. One cannot 
promise in the way M. Jourdain had been speaking prose, nor can one ‘virtu-
ally promise’ in the sense in which one can virtually practice ‘sprezzatura’ 
without the knowledge of the corresponding rules and of the name itself. And 
similarly, one cannot either be playing chess or ‘virtually’ be playing chess 
without at least a vague notion of the rules and the name of what one is doing. 
 
 
3. Morals from the examples: delimitation of the constitutive, its relation to the 
regulative 
 
It is not without a reason, it might therefore seem, that Searle and other stu-
dents of constitutive rules have picked promises and other speech-acts, as well 
as games and sports, as their paradigmatic examples of ‘forms of behaviour’ or 
‘activities’ brought into being and governed by constitutive rules. It is in this 
context that Searle introduces a very important, pivotal point of his concep-
tion of constitutive rules, namely that of ‘counting as’. Typically, he tells us, 
constitutive rules, if formulated in a language (this is one of the places where 
the problem of expressibility comes in) have the form ‘X counts as Y in con-
text Z’.36 The utterance of a promise ‘counts as’ as the undertaking of an obli-
gation.37 This is, in Searle’s eyes, the most central constitutive rule.38 
The issue of ‘counting as’ would require a separate study in its own right. 
On the face of it, things that ‘count as’ other things may, but need not, be 
them, so ‘count is’ looks like a pseudo-copula, neither intensionally nor exten-
___________________________________________ 
believe Prof. DuBois, the life of the Alorese was quite literally permeated with untrust-
worthiness, distrust and frustration. 
35 In Poland, for instance, if my observation is any guide, there is certain widespread scep-
ticism towards, not the binding force of promises, but the likelihood of a given promise’s 
being kept. There is no indication, to my knowledge, that promises are kept in Poland to a 
lesser degree than elsewhere but the scepticism gives the institution, as practiced in Po-
land, a particular local ‘flavour’. 
36 [15], p. 35. 
37 [15], p. 63. 
38 He calls it ‘the essential rule’, [15], p. 63. 
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sionally identical with the classical copula, i. e. ‘is’ (in English).39 The issue of 
‘X counting as Y in context Z’ has already become a separate field of study 
within that of constitutive rules;40 I have hypothesised that if certain things41 
can ‘count as’ other things (in certain contexts), by virtue of a constitutive 
rule, without really being those other things, then a particular mark of consti-
tutive rules could consist in what I not very felicitously called the ‘ontological 
meagreness’ which they presuppose in, or impute to, those things which should 
‘count as’ something else. A constitutive rule expressible in the form ‘X counts 
as Y in context Z’ prescinds from various properties of Y, instead of exploiting 
them (which is typical of prescriptive or regulative rules), though it is obvi-
ously not true that everything can count as everything else.42 Yet, in many 
cases there is considerable room for what an X may be or not be, its ‘counting 
as Y’ remaining thereby unaffected. My proposal was criticised, to a large ex-
tent justly, by Ottonelli.43 However, in the context of promises, the quite pe-
culiar difficulty consists in this, that once a promise has been made according 
to its other, non-essential rules, it is not clear as what else it could ‘count’, 
rather than as the undertaking of an obligation, nor how it could possibly not 
count as the undertaking of an obligation. In other words, someone who is be-
having in accordance with the other (than the essential one) constitutive rules 
of promise as set out by Searle, is not just ‘all but’ undertaking an obligation, 
or ‘virtually’ undertaking an obligation, but is undertaking an obligation 
                                                     
39 St. John put his finger on this problem as he wrote ‘Behold what manner of charity the 
Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God’ 
(Douay-Rheims) or ‘How great is the love the Father has lavished on us, that we should 
be called children of God! And that is what we are!’ (New International Version), 1 Jn, 3, 
1. There is a world of difference between being just called something (and possibly for this 
reason counting as that something or passing for it) and actually being that very thing one 
is called. The Greek text reads ‘ἼΙδετε ποταµὴν ἀγάπην δέδωκεν ἠµῖν ὁ πατὴρ ἵνα 
τέκνα θεοῦ κληθῶµεν, καὶ ἐσµέν’ The last two words, which mean ‘and we are’ are 
not, interestingly, included in all oldest manuscripts of the 1st letter of John. 
40 See for instance [44], ch. 6. Recently, there have been attempts to construct a logic for 
the ‘counts as’, see [45]. 
41 Called by Searle ‘brute’, after [46]. 
42 Acts in which accomplishments beyond the powers of the promissor are promised justly 
do not ‘count as’ promises. On the other hand, in some ‘tricky’ cases certain things ‘count 
as’ other things not despite the fact that they are not those other things, but exactly be-
cause of that fact. For instance, according to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, art. 116 (2) determines that Former German citizens who between 30 January 
1933 and 8 May 1945 were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial or religious 
grounds, and their descendants, shall on application have their citizenship restored. They 
shall be deemed never to have been deprived of their citizenship if they have established 
their domicile in Germany after 8 May 1945 and have not expressed a contrary intention. 
43 [47]. 
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purely and simply. The Searlian ‘essential rule’ does not, therefore, appear to 
be necessary at all. For this reason, Maria-Elisabeth Conte set this kind of 
‘counting as’ (i. e., the utterance of a promise as the undertaking of an obliga-
tion) apart from other kinds of ‘counting as’ and regarded the rules of promise 
as not constitutive at all.44 
So, even the case of promises (a ‘focal case’, to use a convenient term by G. 
E. L. Owen45) is not without its problems. Returning to the broader perspec-
tive afforded by the other examples adduced above, one realises, on reflection, 
that they all – not just promises or games and sports – have certain peculiari-
ties in common which set them apart from clearly prescriptive (and thereby 
non-constitutive) rules, such as the Decalogue. The most striking similarity is 
that no-one has a prima facie obligation to either go through the bruderszaft 
rite or display sprezzatura, or charge interest, or promise anything to anyone. 
True, such obligations may, and usually do arise in particular circumstances, 
but it is due to these circumstances that they do arise, if they do. There are 
other circumstances in which it very well possible to engage in one of above 
‘forms of behaviour’ but in no way obligatory, and, moreover, such circum-
stances are by no means exceptional, non-standard, ‘weird’. Once one has done 
any of the above, one may well have a prima facie obligation to do something, 
for instance, to keep the promise, but that is a different matter. And also, 
there might be situations in which one has a conditional obligation to do 
something, such as for instance display sprezzatura, namely if one is a courtier 
and desires to be considered a good courtier. But there is only such a condi-
tional obligation to it, no more. 
Another similarity is that in most (with the possible exception of interest-
charging, to which I shall return) examples the purpose of engaging in the ac-
tivity concerned consists in achieving a certain end not in any way whatever, 
but in a particular way, defined by the rules of the activity. Switching from 
formal to informal form of address, for instance, is achievable in a variety of 
ways, even in Poland, less expensive than the rite of bruderszaft. The purpose 
of promising is giving the promisee a degree of confidence, but this again can 
be achieved in a simpler way. The purpose of displaying sprezzatura is, 
roughly, being a good Renaissance Italian courtier, but, although in this case 
it cannot be fulfilled in any other way than, among other things, displaying 
                                                     
44 At least not in the (fairly broad) sense of what Amedeo G. Conte calls ‘eidetic-
constitutive rule’; see [18], p. 536. The point is that while formulas like ‘this piece of paper 
counts as legal tender’ clearly assign a role to the X in question (the piece of paper in this 
case), a rule like ‘Saying `I promise [this or that]’ counts as the undertaking of an obliga-
tion’ makes explicit the sense of the act of saying ‘I promise’, so, they say as what the act 
counts, whereas rules of the former sort say what counts as the Y in question, legal tender 
in this case. Amedeo G. Conte calls them X-rules and Y-rules, respectively. 
45 [48], p. 169. 
W. ŻEŁANIEC 
 420
sprezzatura, the latter is an essential, a constitutive component of the purpose. 
This sets our examples apart from street traffic and its rules. It is true that 
street traffic with and without rules are rather different, and the difference is 
in many existential dimensions quite significant; yet the purpose of participat-
ing in street traffic is simply to get to one’s destination; the conformity to traf-
fic-laws is here secondary and has at best instrumental significance. This ex-
plains why we so often do not conform to the laws regulating street traffic. It 
is possible to ‘make it on time’ to an important appointment without speeding, 
but if not, we speed and forget the rules; they ‘get in the way’ of our achieving 
our aim in driving, instead of being a necessary path to that aim, let alone its 
part. 
Such teleological considerations seem, thus, to be helpful in both demarcat-
ing constitutive from non-constitutive rules and in improving our understand-
ing of what constitutive rules are in and by themselves. Credit where credit is 
due: the inspiration comes clearly from Aristotle and the opening lines of his 
Nicomachean Ethics, but in the context of constitutive rules particular atten-
tion to the function of function and goal in the analysis of constitutive rules 
was given by the Bari school: Angiola Filipponio46, Antonio Incampo47 and 
others. Interestingly, as noted by Schwyzer,48 in many cases the purpose of the 
activity defined by constitutive rules is not itself defined by them, and seems 
to lie outside of them. Constitutive rules of chess, for instance, as standardly 
conceived, do not encompass ‘winning’,49 and since winning in chess is (as ob-
served above) not a prima facie obligation of anyone, it may seem hard to see 
why anyone should engage in a game of chess. But an easy answer is that 
‘winning in chess’ is a human possibility, not prescribed or directly defined by 
the rules of chess, but created (here, again, some light is thrown on the ontol-
ogy of rules-constitutivity) by the rules themselves, by their very existence 
and being known, and quite frequently taken advantage of precisely because 
of the peculiar way in which it must be achieved. And this ‘peculiar way’ most 
definitely is directly defined by the rules of chess as constitutive rules. 
What of interest-charging, however? The purpose thereof is clearly making 
profit, in a typical case, at least. And does it make a difference to an aspiring 
                                                     
46 See for instance [49], [50], pp. 177ff. 
47 See for instance [39], pp. 85ff., or [51]. 
48 [52], p. 464. This reference has been brought to my awareness by Prof. Lorini of Cagliari 
University. See [53], p. 118. See also [5]. 
49 To be sure, the laws of chess as formulated by FIDE (World Chess Federation) do define 
the placing the opponent’s king under attack in such a way that the opponent has no legal 
move (http://www.fide.com/component/handbook/?id=124&view=article, under 1.2). But 
this is neither extensionally nor intensionally the same as ‘winning’. Had FIDE not ex-
pressly defined chess as a game, the ‘placing the opponent’s king’ etc. could have been 
practiced in a non-game-like fashion, for instance, as a religious rite. 
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profit-maker in what way he accomplishes his goal? It famously and proverbi-
ally does not, we should be tempted to say. And yet, in a sense, it clearly does: 
The aspiring profit-maker wishes to make profit in the most efficient, ‘eco-
nomical’ way possible; this is all but ‘built in’ into the definition of profit. In a 
given case, a person desiring to make profit on his capital has a certain range 
of possibilities open to him; lending his capital and charging interest on it is 
one of them, if it is at all known to that person and at least some of his pro-
spective partners (as it was not among ancient Teutons, if we are to believe 
Tacitus). He cannot take advantage of that possibility without ‘putting to 
practice’ or implementing the rules of interest-charging, however this institu-
tion is called in his culture and language, and however he or his partners per-
sonally call it among themselves; just as little as a person desiring to give his 
partner confidence on a future act of his by way of promise has any choice but 
to promise. A person desiring to get from home to work by car has, by con-
trast, the choice of doing so in a traffic-law conforming or non-conforming 
fashion. There may be, and in most cases presumably there are rules governing 
interest-charging which are clearly and purely regulative or prescriptive (what 
one may or must not do while charging interest, e. g. what the maximal inter-
est-rate must be and similar) and in some particularly complex cases there 
might doubts as to whether such regulative rules do not regulate to the point 
of constituting, or rather ‘destituting’ (abolishing) the practice of interest-
charging in general; this appears to be exemplified by the debate concerning 
the permissibility or otherwise of interest in Islam.50 
Things are not simple. One’s mind, while pondering such cases as that of in-
terest-charging, is easily brought to much more fundamental issues. It could 
seem, for instance, that helping persons in distress, such as victims of street 
accidents, is, as distinct from charging interest or showing sprezzatura, a prima 
facie obligation of everyone, and in many penal codes failing to give aid to 
such persons is even defined as a crime. Yet, one occasionally reads reports 
from non-European countries (for understandable reasons neither the reports 
nor the countries will be named here) where the default ‘form of behaviour’ in 
the case of a street or road accident seems to be robbing its victims of their 
valuables and running off. Whether true or not (not true, it is to be hoped) 
such reports suggest a different strategy in the research of constitutive rules. 
Rather than look for a clear demarcation line between rules constitutive (on 
one hand) and regulative (on the other) one should face the possibility that in 
social life they may be rule-complexes from which the ones and the others may 
                                                     
50 See for instance [54]. The issue is whether in Islam all interest-charging is prohibited, or 
just excessive interest-charging, i. e. usury. If the only permissible rate of interest is zero, 
all interest-charging (as known in the ‘Christian’ world) is usury. 
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be produced or disengaged by means of philosophical analysis.51 Here is the 
possibility – the ‘mere’ possibility, of which you have up to now simply known 
nothing – of running to the rescue of accident victims, it is done like this and 
like that (this is the constitutive rule); and there is the unconditional obliga-
tion of taking advantage of that possibility (the ‘parasitic’ regulative rule). A 
similar strategy was proposed by Ramsay and Carnap for disentangling syn-
thetic (empirical) and analytic components from meaning postulates for theo-
retical terms of natural sciences.52 It will, however, not be pursued in this es-
say. 
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